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Seven years ago the Supreme Court began a fundamental reexamination
of the power of Congress to expand upon the past interpretations of the Court
defining what specific situations are covered by the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth amendments and what remedies Congress can use to enforce those
amendments. This development has been accompanied by the related and grow-
ing trend of the Supreme Court to test the statutes and practices of state and
local governments according to a much stricter standard of constitutionality gen-
erally known as the "compelling state interest" test.
Could the meteoric rise of the latter doctrine in the extensive field of equal
protection and due process cases, combined with an expanded view of congres-
sional power under the enforcement clauses of the above three Civil War amend-
ments, engulf the very capacity of the states to govern themselves? It is the
purpose of this article to test this fear against the actual trend of judicial and
statutory developments and to suggest some guidelines by which the basic guar-
antees of the Civil War amendments can be effectively secured without danger
of nullifying the separate political character of the states.
I. Congress Acts, The Court Reacts
A. Prologue: Ex parte Virginia
Though it was decided almost a century ago, the Supreme Court decision
which enunciates the basic standard of judicial scrutiny called for in a modem
case involving the enforcement powers of Congress under the Civil War amend-
ments is Ex parte Vbiginia.' This landmark case, decided almost contempora-
neously with the adoption of these amendments,' treats the specific question of
whether an early congressional civil rights statute protecting the right of Negroes
to serve as grand or petit jurors was warranted as appropriate legislation by the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments.' The Court held that the statute was
* This article is an extended and updated version of a shorter paper originally prepared
for the Weaver Essay Program of the American Bar Foundation.
** LL.B., Duke University, 1959; Richardson Foundation Congressional Fellow, 1959-1960;
Assistant Counsel, U.S. Senate Office of Legislative 'Counsel, 1960-1969; Legislative Counsel to
U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater, 1969 to date.
1 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
2 The thirteenth amendment was certified by Secretary of State Seward on December 18,
1865, the fourteenth amendment was certified without reservation on July 28, 1868, and the
fifteenth amendment was certified on March 30, 1870.
3 The statute provided that no citizen, otherwise qualified, shall be barred from service as
grand or petit juror because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. It imposed a
penal sanction against any officer or person charged with any duty in the selection or summons
of any citizen for such service who violated this mandate. 100 U.S. at 339.
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indeed an appropriate exercise of Congress' enforcement power, saying that the
Civil War amendments, "[w]ere intended to be, what they really are, limitations
on the power of the states and enlargements of the power of Congress."4 Re-
defining for purposes of the case the classic formulation by Chief Justice Marshall
of the powers of Congress, as expressed in the necessary and proper clause of
article I, § 8,' the Court described the reach of congressional power to enforce the
Civil War amendments in broad terms:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is adapted to carry out the objects
the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the
prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of
perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against
State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of
congressional power.8
Either explicitly or implicitly, this analysis would prevail time and again through-
out the Court's determination of a significant line of later cases initiated by the
determined attack on racial discimination which Congress launched in the 1960's.
B. Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment
One branch of the rule of Ex parte Virginia flows through a group of cases
decided over the past decade which sustained an increasing breadth of federal
legislation designed to deal with the fifteenth amendment's ban on discrimination
in voting on grounds of race or color. The first pair of these cases' upheld a
fledgling start in this field by Congress, which in a provision of the Civil Rights
Act of 1957 s had authorized the United States to obtain injunctions in the fed-
eral district courts against the continuation of disciminatory registration practices
by state and local officials. Then, in Hanah. v. Larchel the Court sustained the
power of Congress in the same 1957 Act to create a Commission on Civil Rights
to investigate alleged Negro voting deprivations.' 0
In Alabama u. United States," the Court sustained the enactment by
Congress of a totally new approach to its attack on racial discrimination with the
Civil Rights Act of 1960.2 The uniqueness of this law lay in its grant of author-
ity to the United States Attorney General to apply for an order in a federal
district court praying that the court should interpose itself in the state voter
4 Id. at 345.
5 Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
6 100 U.S. at 345-46.
7 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58
(1960).
8 Pub. L. 85-315, 71 Stat. 637 (Act of September 9, 1957), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 et seq.
(1970).
9 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
10 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (1970).
11 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
12 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 et seq. (1970).
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qualification process by affirmatively ordering registration of Negro voters."
Three years later, in United States v. Misissippi,'4 the Court sustained the power
of Congress by the same Act to authorize the Attorney General to file proceedings
against a state for preventive relief in advance of actual discrimination so long
as there are reasonable grounds for belief that any official is about to engage in
any act or practice of racial discrimination in voting. 5 Moreover, this provision
allows the Attorney General to prevent the application of state laws allegedly
used as devices to keep Negroes from voting on account of their race. 6 The
Court held that these provisions were passed by Congress under its authority to
enforce the fifteenth amendment's guarantee "against any discrimination by a
State, its laws, its customs, or its officials, in any way."'17 The Civil Rights Act
of 1960 was again upheld in Louisiana v. United States,'8 where the Attorney
General successfully brought an action striking down a state "citizenship" test
which the Court found had been applied as part of a scheme to deprive Negroes
of their voting rights.'
The landmark of recent fifteenth amendment cases is South Carolina v.
Katzenbach.2" Here the Court reviewed legislation more encompassing than any
Congress had previously passed in the voting field-the Voting Rights Act of
1965. Disappointed with the pace of human rights progress through individual
court cases initiated by the Justice Department, Congress laid down a compre-
hensive formula applying new and broad remedies to entire states and political
subdivisions. One remedy suspended all literacy tests and similar voting qualifica-
tions of covered states and localities for a period of five years.22 A second sus-
pended all new voting regulations pending advance review by federal author-
ities." A third assigned federal examiners to assume the normally exclusive state
function of listing qualified voters.24 The Court rejected the argument that to
allow Congress to so strike down state statutes and procedures would rob the
judiciary of its rightful constitutional role. By adding section 2 of the fifteenth
amendment, the Court found, "[t]he Framers indicated that Congress was to be
chiefly responsible for implementing the rights created in § 1."' 2r Thus, the Court
reaffirmed the conclusion reached in Ex parte Virginia that "[iut is the power of
Congress which has been enlarged."26 The Court reasoned, "[a]ccordingly, in
addition to the courts, Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate the consti-
tutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting." 27 The Court also
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(e) (f) (1970); Cf. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
14 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
15 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1970).
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(a) (c) (1970).
17 380 U.S. at 138.
18 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
19 Id. at 151-53.
20 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
21 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 et seq. (1970).
22 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1970).
23 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1970).
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a)(d) (1970).
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repeated the fundamental ruling first announced in Ex parte Virginia that the
basic test to be applied in a case involving the enforcement clause of the fifteenth
amendment is the same as in all cases concerning the express powers of Congress
with relation to the reserved powers of the states, the analysis of McCulloch V.
Maryland tailored for the particular context of the fifteenth amendment. 8
Finding that the statutory scheme of Congress conformed to this criteria, the
Court upheld the basic constitutionality of the 1965 Act and sustained the power
of Congress to fashion specific remedies without any need for prior adjudication
of state voting practices and legislation.
29
The applicability of the 1965 Act to a broad range of state election laws,
although not specified in the law itself, was established by the Court in Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections" based on the mass of legislative history articulating the
purposes of the Act."1 The Court next sustained application of the ban on
literacy tests against a county where there was no evidence the test had been
openly administered in a discriminatory manner, but where it actually operated
to disenfranchise racial minorities who had suffered previous governmental
discrimination in education.
2
Then in Oregon u. Mitchell," the Court unanimously upheld Congress' latest
effort in this field, section 201 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970."
This provision prohibits the use of any test or device resembling a literacy test
in all federal, state or local elections across the entire United States, not just
selectively in only a few states.
Thus, step-by-step, Congress had encouraged the Court by increasingly
more expansive legislation to adopt increasingly broader interpretations of the
scope of Congress' power under the enforcement clause of the fifteenth amend-
ment. From the initiation of civil actions by the Attorney General and the
utilization of court orders in specific cases and localities, Congress has moved to
the supplanting of state laws and procedures on its own and the substitution of
federal personnel for state voting officials. For all intents and purposes, Congress
has over the past decade effectively caused the Supreme Court to expand its
past interpretations of the situations which are covered by the fifteenth amend-
ment, if, in the doing, Congress itself cannot be said to have expanded upon such
judicial interpretations.
IH. The Court Guides; Congress Follows
A. The Rule of Katzenbach v. Morgan
If the Supreme Court has been moved to a more expansive view of congress-
28 Id.
29 Id. at 327-37.
30 393 U.S. 544 (1969). Accord, Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 387 (1971), decid-
ing that a change in the location of polling places constitutes a "standard, practice, or pro-
cedure with respect to voting," covered by the Voting Rights Act of 1965; Georgia v. United
States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973), confirming the reach of such Act to state reapportionment statutes.
31 Id. at 563-71.
32 Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
33 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
34 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1970).
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ional enforcement power under the fifteenth amendment by a progression of
federal civil rights statutes, each broader than its predecessor, it is the Court who
has encouraged Congress to take a view of its powers under the fourteenth
amendment going beyond what past decisions have reached in specific factual
situations. Congress was stirred into this action primarily by reason of a single
decision, Katzenbach v. Morgan; 5 it also was influenced by a growing line of
other fourteenth amendment cases which, for over a decade, have been steadily
eroding the general authority of the states to legislate on subjects historically
resting within their separate domain.
Morgan, which was the true catalyst for new departures in congressional
protection of civil rights, will be discussed first. On the surface, Morgan treated
the constitutionality of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,"8 a pro-
vision which prohibits enforcement of the New York State English language
literacy test against New York residents from Puerto Rico. It might have been
regarded as just one more link in a chain of decisions overturning state practices
with racially discriminatory overtones. But the decision was not so limited. 7
The Court repeated the well settled principle that Congress' power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment can be measured by reference to its powers under the
necessary and proper clause."8 It then broke new ground of its own by holding:
"Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."3 The Court
applied this conclusion to the facts of the case in an equally broad manner. In
determining whether the federal statute is "plainly adapted" to furthering the
aims of the equal protection clause, as required by the reformulation of Chief
Justice Marshall's analysis, the Court declared that it is for Congress to assess
and weigh the various conflicting considerations involved in legislating.40 The
Court specifically included, among the considerations so reserved for Congress,
an appraisal by it of the risk of discrimination that arose from the state statute
and the effectiveness of the various remedies available by which Congress might
eliminate this risk. 1 The Court also deferred to the judgment of Congress as to
the nature and significance of the state interest that would be affected by the
remedy Congress selected, stating, "It is enough that we be able to perceive a
basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did."4
Thus, Morgan verges on the brink of holding that Congress can be its own
judge of what situations are prohibited by the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment and of what remedies are appropriate to enforce these
35 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
36 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (e).
37 Morgan has since been described by Justice Stewart, with Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun joining, as giving congressional power under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment "[t]he furthest possible legitimate reach." Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 296
(1970).
38 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966).
39 Id. at 651.
40 Id. at 653-56.
41 Id. at 653.
42 Id.
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prohibitions. In addition, the Court bodes close to saying that Congress can
second-guess a state government with respect to the factual determinations which
serve as the basis for a state's law and can make its own binding conclusions even
as to how substantial a state's interest is in passing the law which Congress would
regulate or contravene.
B. The "Compelling State Interest" Test
Of equal importance with the scope of its ruling in Morgan is that the Court
had applied to the New York literacy law a higher standard for review of state
determinations than was traditional." This more exacting standard has come to
be known as the "compelling state interest" test although it has appeared under
different labels. By whatever name it is called, it is directly related to the defer-
ence which the Court gives to congressional legislation under the enforcement
clauses of the Civil War amendments and thereby to Congress' power to effec-
tively expand the Court's interpretations of those amendments. Under this test
Congress can override any state statute which affects important rights unless the
state can demonstrate the statute is necessary to promote a compelling govern-
mental interest.44 In contrast, under traditional analysis a state legislative device
or classification will be sustained unless it is patently "arbitrary" or "invidious"
and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.45
The "compelling interest" test appears to stem from two kinds of cases,
one in which the stricter standard is used because a state statute affects "funda-
mental rights" and the other in which it is used because the statute is based upon
"suspect" criteria. 6 But there is a growing effort within the Court to explain
its past cases, not on the basis of "two neat categories which dictate the appro-
priate standard of review-strict scrutiny or mere rationality, 4 7 but rather on the
basis of the Court's judgment as to the relative importance of the right affected
and invidiousness of the state action.4" Whichever way the standard of review
is cast its application will extend the possibilities for congressional intrusion on
state interests. Under either test, the presumption of constitutionality normally
afforded state statutory schemes is discarded and the burden is shifted to the
43 Id. at 654 n.15; 660-61 (dissenting opinion of Harlan, J., with whom Stewart, J.,
joined).
44 E.g., statement of Justice Brennan that "[o]nce it be determined that a burden has been
placed upon a constitutional right, the onus of demonstrating that no less intrusive means will
adequately protect compelling state interests is upon the party seeking to justify the burden."
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970) (dissenting in part and concurring in part).
45 E.g., United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, - U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 2821, 2825
(1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972), both relating to the field of social
welfare. The traditional equal protection analysis appears to have its origin in the context of
commercial regulation cases which involved state regulation of business and industrial practices.
See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 487-89 (1955).
46 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-62 (1969) (opinion of Harlan, J., dis-
senting).
47 San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (opinion of Marshall,
J., with whom Douglas, J., concurs, dissenting); id. at 62 (opinion of Brennan, J., dissenting).
48 Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 456 (1973) (opinion of White, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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state to show that there is no alternative which results in less impact upon the
individual interest at stake, be it a "fundamental" constitutional right or an
interest of constitutional "importance."
The strict standard of equal protection review appears prominently in the
voting rights field. Since 1965 there have been at least seven decisions upsetting
state or local election schemes based upon exacting judicial scrutiny under the
fourteenth amendment of the state or local governmental objectives and
methods.49 A strict review is also dictated for state statutes providing for federal
congressional redistricting, but the rationale of these decisions is founded upon
article I, § 2, of the Constitution, not the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment."0
One may have thought the Court first developed a new formulation of the
equal protection test in Reynolds v. Sims5 where it disapproved of an apportion-
ment scheme of Alabama;52 but this reading has not been accepted by a majority
of the Court. 3 Instead, the true forebearer of the new standard occurs not in the
legislative redistricting field, where the Court has maintained a dichotomy
between the two lines of congressional districting under article I and state legisla-
tive reapportionments under the fourteenth amendment,54 but rather in the area
of the selective distribution by a state of the franchise. Here the Court has un-
equivocally determined that state voter qualification laws which exclude other-
wise qualified citizens from the franchise must be tested by the stricter standard.5
Similarly, state administrative regulations which deny to citizens their right to
participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens must be examined
49 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337
(1972); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 205 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395
U.S. 701, 704 (1969); Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
50 Under the rigid standard of congressional districting cases, only those population vari-
ances among districts that are "unavoidable" are permitted. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783
(1973); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 546 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preiser, 394 U.S. 526,
531 (1969) ; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964).
51 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
52 In striking down Alabama's plan the Court stressed that "the right of suffrage is a
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society" and held that "any alleged infringe-
ment of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized." Id. at
561-62.
53 The test actually enunciated by the Court in Reynolds was the traditional "rational
state policy" standard. Id. at 579. This more lenient standard has subsequently been applied
in other state districting cases apparently on the basis that state legislative districts are so inter-
twined with strictly local interests that the rigor of the stricter standard is inappropriate to these
predominantly state matters. Moreover, there is a significantly larger number of seats in state
legislative bodies to be distributed within each state than its congressional seats, and it may
be feasible for a state to use political subdivision lines in drawing state districts while still
affording adequate statewide representation. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Gaffney
v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
54 Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973).
55 E.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). In Carrington, the Court overturned
the use by Texas of an irrebuttable statutory presumption that absolutely excluded servicemen
from the vote by classifying them as nonresidents. The Court tested the classification accord-
ing to its necessity to carrying out a state purpose of substantial importance, rather than its
merely serving a convenient state interest.
[February 1974]
[Vol. 49:544] CONGRESS' POWER TO ENHANCE CIVIL WAR AMENDMENTS 551
by strict scrutiny.5 Exceptions to these generalized rules for voting cases fall
into four categories. The stricter "equal protection" standard is not applicable
(1) if the Court finds the state statute cannot pass even the lenient traditional
test,57 (2) where the state does not absolutely disenfranchise the members of any
definable class,"8 (3) when a state elects functionaries whose duties are far
removed from what might be thought of as "normal governmental" authority
and whose actions disproportionately affect the delineated class accorded the
vote, 9 and (4) in federal congressional redistricting situations which are gov-
56 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The Court stressed the
fundamental nature of the right to vote. Id. at 670. Fifteen years earlier, using the traditional
"rational basis" test, the Court had upheld the same Virginia poll tax it struck down under
the new standard applied in Harper. Butler v. Thompson, 341 U.S. 937 (1951).
A parallel situation occurred in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) striking down
the Tennessee one-year durational waiting period. Referring to Drueding v. Devlin, 380 U.S.
125 (1965), decided only seven years earlier, which had upheld Maryland's similar one-year
residence requirement, the Court commented that "if it was not clear then, it is certainly
clear now that a more exacting test is required for any statute that 'place[s] a condition on the
exercise of the right to vote.'" 405 U.S. at 337.
57 Included among the first category of exceptions should be Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23 (1968). Here the Court struck down as creating an "invidious discrimination" Ohio's elec-
tion laws which made it virtually impossible to be placed on the state ballot in presidential
elections. Id. at 34. While the Court's opinion, written by Justice Black, would apply a "com-
pelling interest" standard to the restrictions of Ohio law, five members of the Court, including
two concurring and three dissenting, did not agree with this proposition. Thus, Williams cor-
rectly stands for no more than an application of the "invidious discrimination" test.
The same appears true of Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970), where a Maryland
statute was overturned which created a presumption that persons living on a federal enclave
within the state did not meet the residency requirement for voting in Maryland. The Court
found no reasonable basis for accepting the state's contention that these residents were sub-
stantially less interested in state affairs than other residents of the state. Id. at 426. The
Court did not openly reach the question of whether the stricter test should apply because the
classification was plainly lacking in any rational justification.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), is akin to this principle in the area of personal
privacy. In it the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute which denied unmarried persons
access to contraceptive devices on the same basis as married persons, finding that the law failed
"to satisfy even the more lenient equal protection standard." Id. at 447 n.7.
58 McDonald v. Bd. of Election, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); and Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S.
431 (1971), are instances of the second reason for declining to use the more rigid test. In
McDonald, the right to vote in person was not absolutely precluded in fact or by law. 394 U.S.
at 807. And in Jenness, the Georgia system of placing the names of candidates on the ballot
was found not to have insulated a single potential voter from new political voices. 403 U.S.
at 442.
A recent application of this rule is Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973), where the
Court upheld a provision of New York's election law imposing a time deadline on the enroll-
ment of voters for primary elections. The Court concluded the statute did not prohibit any
class from voting in any election had they chosen to meet the reasonable deadline established
by the law. The complaining persons clearly could have registered and enrolled in the party
of their choice before the deadline but chose not to do so by their own failure to take timely
steps. Id. at 762.
59 The third area in which the Court has declined to apply the strict test in franchise
cases appears in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., 410 U.S. 719. Salyer refused to
extend the popular election of Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969),
discussed in notes 61-62 infra, to a California statute limiting the vote for directors of a
water storage district to landowners. The exception was based on the fact that the water
district has relatively limited authority far removed from normal governmental activities and
that its actions disproportionately affect landowners as a group. Id. at 728. By "affect?' the
Court appears to refer to the direct costs of district projects since under the state scheme land-
owners as a class were to bear the entire burden of the district's costs. Id. The Court kept its
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erned under the special standards applicable to reapportionment of congressional
seats.
60
Perhaps the voting case in which the rule has been most fully articulated is
Kramer v. Union School Dist.6 where the Court held that the equal protection
clause prohibited New York from limiting the vote in school district elections to
parents or guardians of school children and property owners or lessees. The
Court took pains to articulate why it was setting aside the normal presumption
of constitutionality afforded state statutes:
The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given "rational"
classifications in other types of enactments are based on an assumption that
the institutions of state government are structured so as to represent fairly
all the people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in effect a
challenge of this basic assumption, the assumption can no longer serve as
the basis for presuming constitutionality.
2
A more recent case in which the stricter test appears, but under a different
label, is Bullock v. Carter.3 Here the Court openly discussed at length when
the stricter standard applies and when it does not. The case arose out of the
Texas filing fee scheme which prevented some potential candidates from seeking
the nomination of their party due to their inability to pay the fee. Concluding
that the Texas laws had a real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the
franchise and that this impact was related to the resources of the voters support-
ing a particular candidate, the Court held "that the laws must be 'closely
scrutinized' and found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate
state objectives in order to pass constitutional muster."64 Given the exacting
standard it required, the Court found the Texas laws unnecessary to pursue even
the substantial state interest in financing the cost of its primaries.
Although the stricter equal protection test has most often been applied in
the "fundamental right" area to state classifications which limit the franchise,
the Court has also used the stricter standard of review in safeguarding other
fundamental rights such as the right to travel,65 freedom of speech,66 and free-
dom to procreate.6 1 Moreover, it is well settled that under the equal protection
clause the basic presumption of the constitutional validity of a state law "dis-
appears when a State has enacted legislation whose purpose or effect is to create
classes based upon criteria that, in a constitutional sense, are inherently 'sus-
pect.' "' Consistent with the central purpose of the fourteenth amendment to
decision within the guidelines of its general rule insofar as lessees who farm the land are con-
cerned by noting that this group was not totally disenfranchised. The California law provides
for voting by proxy and the lessee has a free opportunity to bargain for the right to vote at
the time he negotiates his lease. Id. at 733.
60 See notes 50 and 53, supra.
61 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
62 Id. at 628.
63 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
64 Id. at 144.
65 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
66 Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972).
67 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538-42 (1942).
68 San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (opinion of Stewart, 3.,
concurring).
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eliminate official racial discrimination, the Court has decided that a classifica-
tion based upon race is one such "suspect" category.0 Other classifications
determined to create "suspect" categories include those based upon alienage, 0
national origin,"' illegitimacy,"2 wealth, 3 and arguably, sex.74
The special standard for testing state laws also is found in fourteenth amend-
ment due process cases dating back at least to Schneider u. State,75 which upheld
the freedoms of speech and press "as fundamental personal rights and liberties."
Subsequent due process cases in which the Court has held that the state interest
needed to justify the infringement of fundamental rights must be "compelling,"
and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a legitimate govern-
mental purpose fall into at least six subject areas: 7 (1) academic liberty and
political freedom of the individual, 77 (2) the freedom of association," (3) the
69 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
196 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
70 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
71 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944).
72 Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406
U.S. 164, 173 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
73 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
But according to the Court's majority opinion in San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973), wealth discrimination alone does not provide an adequate basis for
invoking strict scrutiny. Rather, the precedents of the Court require that two distinguishing
characteristics of wealth classification must be found: (1) because of their indigency, the per-
sons discriminated against are completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and (2) as
a consequence, they sustain an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that
benefit. Justice Marshall, dissenting in the same case, contends these decisions are actually
premised on the fundamental importance of the state service involved, but his analysis is
clearly rejected by the Court's majority. Id. at 102 n.61.
74 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), struck down the statutory distinction
made by Federal law which deprived servicewomen of the right to claim their spouses as a
"dependent" for purposes of obtaining certain allowances and benefits. Justice Brennan, joined
by Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall, concluded that classifications based on sex are in-
herently suspect and must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at 682. They found at
least "implicit support" for this approach in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Though
Frontiero presented a question of a violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
this characterization is equally applicable to state classifications challenged under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Whether sex is indeed now included as a "suspect" classification is uncertain since Justice
Stewart, concurring in the judgment, 411 U.S. at 691, reached only the point of agreeing the
discrimination was "invidious," and Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun, expressly reserved for the future any decision on adding sex to the suspect category.
Justice Powell's opinion specifically argued Reed "did not add sex to the narrowly limited
group of classifications which are inherently suspect." Id. Mr. Justice Rehnquist would have
sustained the constitutionality of the statutes in question.
75 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
76 The minority in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), would argue that the Court
has applied the stricter test to a seventh area, the right of obtaining a higher education, but the
Court's opinion, written by Justice Stewart, is narrowly drawn along the lines of past tradi-
tional due process cases. Id. (Contra, Burger, C. J., dissenting).
77 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 265 (1957) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
78 Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
463 (1958).
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free exercise of religion 7 9 (4) the right of free expression, ° (5) the right of per-
sonal privacy,"1 and (6) the right to vote in both federal and state elections."2
The extension of the "compelling interest" test to these several classes of funda-
mental rights, both in the equal protection and due process fields, and to the
field of "suspect" classifications could foreshadow the supervention of the states
by Congress in virtually every field where a state traditionally governs itself and
its people. The question has been raised by members of the Court whether every
state statute might not affect some basic human rights or create classifications
permanent in duration which are less than perfect.8 4
III. The Court Applies a Brake
A. Congressional Use of the "Compelling Interest" Test
Oregon v. Mitchell" heralds the first strong brake by the Court on the
"compelling interest" test and the intrepid slide toward making Congress the
judge of its own enforcement powers under the Civil War amendments. In a
near unanimous decision, but with no single rationale enjoying a majority, the
Court's judgment upheld Congress' power in the Voting Rights Act Amendments
of 19706 to set uniform residency requirements and absentee balloting standards
in elections for presidential and vice presidential electors. In the same decision
and again with no single reasoning prevailing, the Court held that Congress can-
not interfere with the age set for voters by the states for state and local elections
but can control age qualifications in federal elections alone. The only reasoning
supported by a majority of the Court was that Congress has ample power under
the enforcement clause of the fifteenth amendment to prohibit the use of literacy
tests or other devices to discriminate against voters on account of their race in
all elections, state and national.
The previously discussed literacy test provision aside, the statutory schemes
considered in Oregon represent the first legislative enactments by Congress to
expressly utilize the "compelling interest" doctrine as a means for expanding
Congress' power under the Civil War Amendments. Both section 202 of title II,
79 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
80 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
81 As to marital privacy, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (opinion
of Goldberg, J., with whom Warren, C. J., and Brennan, J., joined). As to the right of a
woman to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy by abortion, subject to compelling
state interests with respect to protection of health, medical standards and potential life, see
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-55. (1973).
82 United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234, 251 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd, 384 U.S. 155 (1966).
83 Justice Harlan, dissenting from the Court's application of strict scrutiny to a law penal-
izing the right of interstate travel, complained that "[v]irtually every state statute affects impor-
tant rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969).
84 Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 459 (1973) (opinion of Chief Justice Burger, joined by
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting).
85 400 U.S. 112 (1970). For a brief note on the development of the compelling state
interest doctrine in voting rights cases and an analysis of Oregon, see Weller, Oregon v. Mitchell
and the Compelling State Interest Doctrine - The End of An Era?, 22 SYRAcusE L. Rav. 1123
(1971Y.
86 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq. (1970).
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setting presidential elector regulations,"7 and title III, providing for the 18-year-
old vote,8 include specific findings by Congress that the application of restric-
tive state laws does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling state in-
terest.
B. Section 202 - Presidential Election Reforms
Since § 202 was introduced first and literally served as a drafting model
for the Congressional findings made in title III, this provision will be exam-
ined first. Section 202 clears away a broad range of technical barriers which had
previously impeded the right to vote for President of nearly ten million Ameri-
cans." The incredible mishmash of disorganized state and local regulations that
formerly had existed, kept fully-qualified citizens away from the polls for no
reason other than their failure to meet some unwarranted and outmoded legal
technicality." Some citizens could not vote because they had been residents of
87 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-I (1970), which reads in pertinent part:
The Congress hereby finds that the imposition and application of the durational
residency requirement as a precondition to voting for the offices of President and Vice
President, and the lack of sufficient opportunities for absentee registration and ab-
sentee balloting in presidential elections -
(1) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to vote for
their President and Vice President;
(2) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to enjoy their
free movement across State lines;
(3) denies or abridges the privileges and immunities guaranteed to the citizens
of each State under article IV, section 2, clause 1, of the Constitution;
(4) in some instances has the impermissible purpose or effect of denying citizens
the right to vote for such officers because of the way they may vote;
(5) has the effect of denying to citizens the equality of civil rights, and due
process and equal protection of the laws that are guaranteed to them under the four-
teenth amendment; and
(6) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest in the
conduct of presidential elections. (Emphasis added.)
88 42 U.S.C. § 1973bb (1970), which reads in pertinent part:
(a) The Congress finds and declares that the imposition and application of the
requirement that a citizen be twenty-one years of age as a precondition to voting in
any primary or in any election -
(1) denies and abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens eighteen
years of age but not yet twenty-one years of age to vote - a particularly unfair
treatment of such citizens in view of the national defense responsibilities imposed
upon such citizens;
(2) has the effect of denying to citizens eighteen years of age but not yet twenty-
one years of age the due process and equal protection of the laws that are guaranteed
to them under the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution; and
(3) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest.
For a pre-Oregon discussion of the relationship between the compelling interest test and
title III, see Engdahl, Constitutionality of the Voting Age Statute, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1
(1970).
89 See detailed explanation cataloguing the numbers of citizens disqualified from voting
in presidential elections, at 116 CONG. REc. 6990-91 (1970). A survey by the author supports
a high estimate of the prospective absentee voting population. Based on statistics from all
states reporting absentee ballot totals, and replies from the office of the Secretary of State in
selected states, 4,135,466 presidential absentee votes were cast in 1972. This is an increase of
26% over 1968.
90 See tables of restrictive state laws applicable to registration and balloting procedures
and eligibility in presidential elections at 116 CoNG. IEc. 6994-96 (1970).
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the state for only eleven months and could not meet the one year residence
requirement. Others were ineligible because they were traveling outside the
state on election day and were not allowed to obtain absentee ballots. Another
category of disenfranchised citizens included nearly a million visitors, students,
civil service employees, and businessmen who were overseas and found them-
selves among the three out of every five civilian citizens who could not register
absentee.91
Section 202 made a dramatic overhauling of residency and absentee regu-
lations in presidential elections. Enacted in substantive form exactly as intro-
duced, the legislation abolished the durational residency requirement as a pre-
condition to voting for President and Vice President, both for citizens who move
from state-to-state or within the same state;9 2 established a uniform national right
of registering and voting by absentee process in presidential elections;9" and
91 A possible setback for overseas citizens seeking the vote under section 202 is Hardy v.
Lomenzo, 349 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Hardy moved from New York to Brazil in 1964
because of business obligations, intending to return at some indefinite time in the future. His
request for absentee registration was rejected on the basis of a New York law which requires
"a fixed, permanent and principal home" in the state as a condition of "residence." The dis-
trict court upheld New York's refusal to permit Hardy to register on the basis that each state
can determine for itself who is a bona fide resident. Id. at 620.
On reargument, the court allowed Senator Goldwater to intervene amicus curiae and agreed
that the Senator's purpose as author of section 202 shows "a clear intent to provide the broadest
possible opportunity to citizens to register to vote in a Presidential election. . . ." Neverthe-
less, the Court held that in this case the state was "entitled to stronger evidence of allegiance
than that here presented." Id. at 621-22.
To the extent the court's opinion means a state can go behind a citizen's application and
insist on reasonable supporting evidence of his statements of facts and intent, section 202
permits each state to determine who is among its true residents. But to the extent the court's
language leaves open the possibility that a state may require as a precondition of residence the
maintenance of a fixed, physical home in the state, the court erred in its construction of the
federal law.
Section 202 is intended to prohibit the discriminatory application of state laws against
citizens on the basis of their physical presence or absence from a particular state or political
subdivision. However, in the words of the Secretary of State of New York, the state "definition
of residency demands that there be a claim to a specific physical location before any supporting
indicia may be considered." (Emphasis added.) Letter from John P. Lomenzo to Barry Gold-
water, Nov. 17, 1972. This means that regardless of the citizen's financial inability to main-
tain two separate physical homes, one abroad and one in the state, at the same time, the state
forecloses alternative means of proving his residence. Thus, the test absolutely precludes some
actual residents from voting on the basis of their wealth. Moreover, the state penalizes the
right to travel by forcing upon a person, who wishes to travel and work abroad, the choice
between travel and his basic right to vote, unless he is affluent enough to own or rent two
homes. See Amicus Curiae Brief in Behalf of Overseas Voters of Senator Barry Goldwater, 118
CONG. REc. 17894-99 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1972).
The failure of the court in Hardy to reach this specific question leaves the matter in doubt
and further congressional action will most surely be taken in the near future to erase that
doubt. See Hearings on S. 2102 and S. 2384, Before the Senate Subcomm. on Privileges and
Elections of the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
92 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1(c) (1970), reads in pertinent part:
No citizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote in any election
for President and Vice President shall be denied the right to vote for electors for
President and Vice President . . . in such election because of the failure of such
citizens to comply with any durational residency requirement of such State or political
subdivision. . ..
93 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-I (c) (1970), lays down the general prohibition:
[Nor] shall any citizen of the United States be denied the right to vote for electors
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mandated that the polls be kept open at reasonable times for registration by
both new and long-time residents of a state until at least 30 days before the
election. 4
In making these sweeping changes in state laws and practices, Congress
relied upon at least four distinct grounds for the exercise of congressional author-
ity.s In Oregon the Supreme Court was to seize upon each of these justifications
in upholding § 202. First, § 202 rested upon Congress' power to secure the rights
inherent in national citizenship,"6 which include the right to vote for federal
officers. 7 Since these rights adhere to United States citizenship, rather than citi-
zenship of a state, Congress believed it could give them protection under the
for President and Vice President . .. because of the failure of such citizen to be
physically present in such State or political subdivision at the time of such election, if
such citizen shall have complied with the requirements prescribed by the law of such
State or political subdivision providing for the casting of absentee ballots in such
election.
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-l(d), (f) (1970), prescribes the minimum standards which a state
shall put into practice:
(d) For the purpose of this section . . . each State shall provide by law for the
casting of absentee ballots for the choice of electors for President and Vice President
... by all duly qualified residents of such State who may be absent from their elec-
tion district or unit in such State on the day such election is held and who have
applied therefor not later than seven days immediately prior to such election and have
returned such ballots to the appropriate election official of such State not later than
the time of closing of the polls in such State on the day of such election....
(f) No citizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote by absentee
ballot in any State or political subdivision in any election for President and Vice
President shall be denied the right to vote for the choice of electors for President and
Vice President . . . in such election because of any requirement of registration that
does not include a provision for absentee registration.
That part of section 202(d) allowing the return of absentee ballots as late as the close of
polls was upheld against a contrary provision of New York state law in Hershcopf v. Lomenzo,
350 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
94 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1 (d) (1970), provides in pertinent part:
(d) For the purposes of this section, each State shall provide by law for the
registration or other means of qualification of all duly qualified residents of such State
who apply, not later than thirty days immediately prior to any presidential election,
for registration or qualification to vote for the choice of electors for President and
Vice President ... in such election....
This provision has correctly been construed to require that registration be provided at
reasonable periods of time during crucial pre-election weeks, although the statute itself does
not specify the precise number of days during which registration facilities should be kept open.
Acting on the underlying concern of Congress "to provide the broadest possible opportunity to
citizens to register to vote in a Presidential election," a three-judge Federal Court held that
section 202 must prevail over a related section of the New York Election Act to the extent the
latter would prohibit a voter from being afforded the opportunity to register personally at
reasonable pre-election times. Bishop v. Lomenzo, 350 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
95 Section 202(a) note 87 supra.
96 Rights belonging to national citizenship "arise from the relationship of the individual
with the Federal government" and are directly dependent on the Constitution: United States
v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 77-80 (1951); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79
(1872); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430-31 (1870); Paul v. Virginia, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868).
97 The right to vote for national elective officers, including members of Congress and
presidential electors, has been expressly recognized as a right directly secured to citizens by the
Constitution: United States v. Classic. 313 U.S. 299, 314, 315 (1941); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 62 (1900); In Re Quarles, 158
U.S. 532, 538 (1895) ; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663 (1884).
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necessary and proper clause of article I." A related basis for Congress' action
was its design to protect the fundamental and national right or privilege of
travel by a citizen, without sacrificing his right to vote.""
As an alternative ground, Congress used its reading of the then recent case
of Katzenbach v. Morgan to assert an exercise of power under the fourteenth
amendment."' Viewed as a fourteenth amendment matter, § 202 protected
against a discriminatory classification in voting between citizens who were new
or long-time residents and between those who were physically present or absent
at the time of registration or voting.'' In light of similar state laws which indi-
cated states could satisfy their legitimate interests by the rules it was legislating,
Congress saw no compelling reason why a state should condition the right to
vote for President on the duration of a citizen's residence or a resident's physical
presence or absence at the polls. For example, 40 states then allowed certain
classes of their residents to register until 30 days or sooner before each presi-
dential election. State practice itself had demonstrated that the 30-day rule of
§ 202 would not be administratively impracticable.0 2 Moreover, 37 states al-
lowed application for absentee voting by certain persons within a week of the
election, and 40 permitted the marked ballot of absentee voters to be returned
as late as on election day; 0 " both standards were incorporated into § 202 as
national criteria.' The fact that so many states had been able to satisfy their
administrative needs for part of their citizens by providing for these several
exceptions from their general regulations demonstrated that more restrictive
rules were not necessary to serve any compelling interest.0 5
The fourth basis of Congress' power to adopt legislation creating uniform
standards for voting in presidential elections is its authority to enforce the privi-
leges and immunities guaranteed to citizens of all the states. Here it was Con-
gress' purpose of correcting the incredible system of conflicting state and local
requirements applicable to presidential elections which created a serious inequal-
ity of treatment as among citizens of one state compared with citizens of other
states.
Eight members of the Court upheld Congress' power to adopt the uniform
regulations of § 202. Justice Breunan, joined by Justices Marshall and White,
98 As stated by Chief justice Waite in United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875),
the "rights and immunities created by or dependent upon the Constitution of the United
States can be protected by Congress." See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310
(1879).
99 The freedom to travel across state lines has long been held to occupy a position
fundamental to "the nature of our Federal union and our Constitutional concepts of personal
liberty." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 757 (1966); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 47 (1867). Travel abroad has
also been held to be a basic aspect of each citizen's liberty: Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,
126 (1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964).
100 It was noted that Morgan had upheld a congressional ban against an English language
literacy test similar to one which the Court had found constitutional five years earlier in Las-
siter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
101 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 284-89 (1970).
102 Id. at 282, 291.
103 Id. at 283, 292.
104 Section 202(d) note 94 supra.
105 400 U.S. at 238-39.
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rested his opinion squarely upon the "compelling interest" doctrine and Con-
gress' power to enforce the fourteenth amendment by "eliminating an unneces-
sary burden on the right of interstate migration.""' 6 Justice Douglas also upheld
§ 202 as a means to enforce the fourteenth amendment, but related his opinion
to section 1 of that amendment, the privileges and immunities clause.10 7 Justice
Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, sustained § 202
on the ground of the authority of Congress to protect and facilitate the exercise
of privileges of United States citizenship under the necessary and proper clause
of article I without regard to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.' ° He
wrote that the freedom to travel from state to state without loss of the franchise
is one of the privileges "that finds its protection in the Federal Government
and is national in character."'" 9 Consequently, as against the reserved power of
the states, it was enough for these Justices that the objective of § 202 to guarantee
the privilege to travel was a legitimate one and that Congress had chosen a ra-
tional means to achieve that end."' Justice Black, who announced the judgment
of the Court, also rejected the fourteenth amendment as a basis for Congress'
action, but agreed that Congress could enact § 202 pursuant to the necessary
and proper clause. He based his view on the final authority which Congress has
to make laws over federal elections."' Only Justice Harlan believed § 202 was
invalid on any ground." 2
The precision with which § 202 was drafted may explain the broader sup-
port it received among the Court than did the voting age change. The three
Justices who, as shall be discussed, ruled for the authority of Congress to enact
the residence provision, but against its power to legislate an age qualification,
remarked:
The power that Congress has exercised in enacting § 202 is not a general
power to prescribe qualifications for voters in either federal or state elec-
tions. It is confined to federal action against a particular problem clearly
within the purview of congressional authority.118
In this sense, a majority of the Court united on the proposition that the
power of the states over matters normally within their general jurisdiction is
subject to the power of Congress to vindicate the personal rights or privileges
which the Court has determined to be secured to the citizen by the Federal
Constitution. If Congress acts with the objective of protecting these rights or
privileges in a narrowly drawn manner, rather than with the purpose of passing
general legislation over a state-reserved field, congressional power exists to estab-
lish specific regulations attacking a particular problem in the field.
But even the application of this conservative rule illustrates that Congress
106 Id. at 239.
107 Id. at 147-50.
108 Id. at 285-92.
109 Id. at 287.
110 Id. at 286.
111 Id. at 120, 134.
112 Id. at 213-16.
113 Id. at 292 (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J.).
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can "expand" the protection of the Civil War amendments previously defined
by Supreme Court decisions. Section 202 abolished the durational waiting
period for new residents in presidential elections two years before the Supreme
Court narrowed the same practice in state and local elections" 4 and six years
after it had upheld the same requirements as applied in presidential elections
absent an act of Congress."'
C. Title III-The 18-Year-Old Vote
The major check on congressional power under the enforcement clauses
was reached with the Court's consideration of title III of the Voting Rights Act
of 1970, which sought to extend the vote to 18-year-olds in all elections. The
holding was closely decided with four Justices agreeing that Congress could
enforce the right of voting under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment against limitations by state laws which Congress concluded were
unfair or unnecessary voting restrictions;". but five members of the Court found
no such power resting in Congress." 7
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White concluded that proper regard for
the special function of Congress in making determinations of legislative fact
compelled the Court to respect those determinations independent of any state
finding argued in support of a given state discrimination. Under the doctrine
of the supremacy clause, Congress could make its own determination of whether
or not the factual basis necessary to support a state legislative discrimination
actually exists. Thus, Congress could conclude on its own that 18-year-olds are
not substantially less capable of a responsible exercise of the vote. Once having
made this finding, it could remove the age discrimination under the enforcement
clause of the fourteenth amendment so long as it could rationally find that the
discrimination was unnecessary to promote any legitimate state interest."' Jus-
tice Douglas' separate opinion on the 18-year-old vote provision conforms with
this same analysis."'
Three members of the Court, Justices Stewart and Blackmun, and Chief
Justice Burger, sharply criticized the view "[tihat Congress has the power to
determine what are and what are not 'compelling state interests' for equal pro-
tection purposes.""'  These Justices wrote that the voting age provision:
is valid only if Congress has the power not only to provide the means of
eradicating situations that amount to a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, but also to determine as a matter of substantive constitutional law
what situations fall within the ambit of the clause, and what state interests
are "compelling."'-2
114 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
115 Druedingv. Devlin, 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
116 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 134-44 (1970) (opinion of Douglas, J.); id. at 239-
81 (Part III of opinion of Brennan, J., joined by White and Marshall, J. J.).
117 Id. at 119-31 (opinion of Black, J.); id. at 212-13 (opinion of Harlan, J.); id. at 293-
96 (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J.).
118 Id. at 246-50 (opinion by Brennan, J.).
119 Id. at 135-44 (opinion by Douglas, J.).
120 Id. at 295.
121 Id. at 296.
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And they wrote, "to test the power to establish an age qualification by the
'compelling interest' standard is really to deny a State any choice at all....
Even so, these members allowed in somewhat ambiguous language
that Congress could impose on the States a remedy for the denial of equal
protection that elaborated upon the direct command of the Constitution,
and that it could override state laws on the ground that they were in fact
us6d as instruments of invidious discrimination even though a court in an
individual lawsuit might not have reached that factual conclusion. 2s (Em-
phasis added.)
The swing Justice, Mr. Black, upheld the power of Congress to enfranchise
18-year-old citizens in national elections only on the ground that Congress can
control voter qualifications in federal elections. 24 Justice Harlan disagreed that
title III could be supported on any conceivable ground. 2
That a conservative could comfortably adopt the stricter test as a means
to support Congressional action over the age standard is evident in the position
taken by Senator Goldwater in support of the uniform age provision. Arguing
on the basis of Texas v. United States," which had sustained the power of
Congress to prohibit the use of the poll tax as a prerequisite to voting in state
elections, the Senator contended the light to vote in both state and federal elec-
tions was a fundamental right which can be secured against any state law not
promoting a compelling governmental interest.'27 From the outcome of Oregon,
this view misjudged the Court's position by a single vote. While there is a right
to vote in state elections "[o]n an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdic-
tion, 2 the right to vote in state elections itself has not become firmed in the
law." Nevertheless, it was a fair reading of the Court's past cases and one that
may yet prevail.
IV. The Thirteenth Amendment Revisited
Lest it be thought the thirteenth amendment is dormant, the Supreme Court
has recently defined a new breadth of authority in Congress under this amend-
ment. In Jones v. Mayer Co.' the Court held that a century-old act of Con-
gress banning racial discrimination in the rental and sale of property could be
enforced against private, as well as public, racial discrimination.' 3 Applying
122 Id. at 294.
123 Id. at 296.
124 Id. at 125-26. Justice Black argued that the case cannot properly be decided under the
equal protection clause since this clause "was never intended to destroy the State's power to
govern themselves.. . ." Id. at 126.
125 Id. at 200-13 (opinion by Harlan, J.).
126 384 U.S. 155 (1966).
127 Hearings on S. J. Res. 7 and Others Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amend-
ments of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 136-38 (1970).
128 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
129 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
130 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
131 Id. at 437-44. Another recent decision imbuing new vigor into the thirteenth amend-
ment is Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). Here Negro citizens filed a damages
action under a century-old statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970), charging a private conspiracy
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the now standard reformulation of the analysis of McCulloch v. Maryland to
the question of the appropriateness of the measure, the Court ruled that the
authority of Congress to enforce the thirteenth amendment "by appropriate
legislation" includes the power to eliminate all racial barriers to the acquisition
of real and personal property.13 2 Heralding a vast and rejuvenated scope for
independent judgment by Congress under the original Civil War amendment,
the Court emphasized that Congress itself can determine what are the badges
and incidents of slavery and can translate that determination into effective legis-
lation."' The Court added that the badges and incidents of slavery which Con-
gress may attack encompass restraints on all the fundamental rights which make
up "the essence of civil freedom.""3 4 This language appears to foretell a broad
area for future legislative enhancement of the Court's prior interpretations of
what kinds of discrimination are reached by the thirteenth amendment, should
Congress choose to act."3 5
V. Postscript: Congress May Not Dilute Rights
The same standard of review which bodes an expanding role for Congress
does not signal a like authority for Congress to weaken constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court has not only forewarned Congress that the "compelling
interest" doctrine in no way supports restrictions on human rights, but the
Court has applied this very rule against the validity of congressional enactments
which have infringed on personal freedoms. For example, in Aptheker v. Secre-
tary of State"6 the Court was called upon for the first time to directly consider
the constitutionality of a federal restriction upon the right to travel abroad.
The Court held that the law, which effectively prohibited travel outside the
Western Hemisphere by members of the Communist party, failed to satisfy the
strict rule of necessity which was applicable to such restrictions. Even though
the governmental interest asserted might be legitimate and substantial, the Court
indicated, that purpose cannot be achieved by means which stifle fundamental
to interfere with their rights as citizens. The Court held that the statute encompasses the
conduct of private persons as well as conspiracies under color of state law and ruled that
Congress may, by the thirteenth amendment, create a statutory cause of action for Negro
citizens who have been the victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action
aimed at depriving them of the basic rights of free men.
132 392 U.S. at 443-44.
Almost simultaneously with the Court's decision of Jones, Congress enacted title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970), providing detailed means for
securing fair housing throughout the United States. These provisions, applicable to a broad
range of discriminatory practices, have been sustained under the thirteenth amendment by
lower courts. E.g., United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969); United
States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
133 392 U.S. at 440.
134 Id. at 441.
135 See also United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966),
decree modified, 380 F.2d 385 (1967, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was upheld as appropriate legislation under the thirteenth amendment
in circumstances where the law constituted a plain congressional alternative to court desegre-
gation remedies and in fact accelerated school desegregation beyond the pace theretofore set
by the judicial branch itself.
136 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.137 Similarly,
in United States v. Jackson... a provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act was in-
validated because the element of necessity was absent.'39 And, in Shapiro v.
Thompson' the Court held that it would be unconstitutional for Congress to
permit the states to impose a one-year waiting period which denied public assis-
tance to poor persons otherwise eligible. Rejecting the dissent by Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Black, the Court's majority stated, "Congress may not
authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause."'' Shapiro squarely
presented a situation where the Court used the "compelling interest" standard
to invalidate a state regulation and yet in the identical case refused to give a
federal statute any broader scope under that standard where to do so would
have meant allowing Congress to infringe on human rights.
Thus, the Court has proven in practice the admonishment it gave by dictum
in Katzenbach v. Morgan: the fourteenth amendment "does not grant Con-
gress power to exercise discretion in the other direction and to enact 'statutes
so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this
court.' ")142 From this, it may be said that the Court will use the stricter standard
and its more expansive view of Congressional power under the enforcement
clauses only to protect personal rights and liberties, not in any way to restrict,
abridge, or weaken these guarantees.'43
VI. Some Proposed Limits on Congressional Action
The limits on Congressional sallies under the enforcement clauses of the
three Civil War amendments must stem from the good sense of Congress and a
healthy respect by both Congress and the judiciary for the maintenance of the
federal system as a viable feature of the unique American political experiment.
Before venturing into new situations which abrogate long-standing state pro-
cedures which the judiciary itself has not been ready to judge improper, Congress
should consciously and conscientiously examine the precedence for what it is
proposing among the usage of the states themselves. Congress should ask itself
whether a sizable body of states had ever put into practice the requirements
Congress is about to ask all states to implement. Were these same rules proven
feasible in the complex realities of everyday administration? Did the new rules
actually achieve the remedies sought by Congress when they were tried among
the states already living with them? Congress also should make a deliberate
appraisal of the nature and significance of the interests which states may have in
retaining their present procedures. This is not to say that Congress has power to
make a constitutionally superior judgment on the matter, but that Congress ought
to explore the subject out of a respect and fairness toward state governments as
important institutions in their own right.
137 Id. at 508.
138 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
139 Id. at 582.
140 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
141 Id. at 641.
142 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966).
143 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 249 n.31 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
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For its part, the Court should plainly recognize when it is applying the
"compelling interest" standard to test a state statute and when it is not. It
should not be sloppy in using the exacting test and should develop clearcut
precedents for the guidance of Congress in this relatively new dimension of en-
forcement legislation. Merely by closely observing the difference between the
standard test and the rigid one, as was done in Bullock v. Carter,44 the Court
may place some self-restraint on its exercise of the unusually stringent rule. Even
more necessary, the Court, prodded by a lively discussion within the legal profes-
sion and in the public forum, must shape its own delimiting boundaries on using
the stricter standard. In carrying on this review, it is suggested that the Court
should pay more than lip service to the prominent theme which runs through all
of these cases, the element of necessity. By examining whether a state law really
is necessary-whether there truly is any other reasonable and practical means of
accomplishing the goal of the statute under attack without infringing a protected
freedom-the Court can guard against totally abrogating the authority of a state
over a particular subject. Obviously, the states would retain a far greater scope
for governing their own affairs if they were to be actually left with the choice
of using an alternative means of pursuing their valid interests, instead of being
left with no choice at all. More basically, the Court should make an effort to
explain why the strict scrutiny test is applicable in the particular setting and to
provide an analytic basis for the result reached. This is the prescription of Chief
Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, in the former's dissent in Vlandis v.
Kline,'45 and it offers much food for thought. The Court's task, according to the
Chief Justice, is not routinely to see whether there is some conceivably "less
restrictive" alternative to the state statute under review, but to explain why the
statute impairs a genuine constitutional interest truly worthy of the standard of
close judicial scrutiny.
Though it did not involve an act of Congress and the distinct matter of
congressional prerogative under the enforcement clauses, the recent case of San
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez"' provides exactly the kind of narrowed
analysis advanced by the Chief Justice. This case involved the Texas system of
financing public elementary and secondary education significantly out of locally
assessed property taxes." A majority of the Court rejected a class action brought
by Mexican-American parents on behalf of members of minority groups and poor
persons who reside in school districts with a low property tax base. For several
reasons given in a lengthy analysis,"~ the Court's majority was unpersuaded that
the case could be fitted into previous decisions in which strict scrutiny was re-
quired. The five member majority concluded that the Texas system does not
discriminate against a "suspect" class 9 nor does it interfere with a "funda-
144 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
145 412 U.S. 441, 459 (1973).
146 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
147 For the 1970-1971 school year local taxation contributed 41.1% of all public school
funds.
148 San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17-44 (1973) (Part II of opinion
of Powell, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, J. J.).
149 Id. at 28.
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mental" constitutional right."" Probing the hard threshold questions which it
indicated must be focused on before a state's laws are subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny, the Court found that children in the poorer property districts were not
denied an adequate education and could not be fairly defined as suffering the
loss of such an education because of their indigency."'5 Therefore, the two dis-
tinguishing characteristics of wealth discrimination found in the Court's previous
cases were not present. First, the Texas school financing system did not operate to
the peculiar disadvantage of any definable category of "poor" people; and
second, the lack of wealth did not result in an absolute deprivation of public
education." 2
Even if the case were to be examined from the standpoint of "district"
wealth discrimination, rather than on the basis of "individual income character-
istics," the Court declined to extend its most exacting scrutiny with respect to
such "a large, diverse, and amorphous class," which had none of the traditional
indicia of suspectness. 5 s Justice Powell's opinion for the Court reasoned that:
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of
the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. 5'
Thus, the Court formulated an important guide for defining what nature of
groups could claim the special protection accorded "suspect" classes and charted
a new limit on the difficult "compelling interest" doctrine. Further, the Court
refined its analysis of what constitutes a "fundamental" right and thereby sought
to underline the limits of this part of the rationale employed in the Court's strict
scrutiny decisions. Justice Powell's majority opinion expressly rejected the idea
that the "importance" of a service or benefit provided by the state should de-
termine whether it must be regarded as fundamental. 55 His statement argued
that if the Court picked out particular human activities and characterized them
as fundamental depending on a majority's view of the importance of the interest
affected, it would indeed be assuming a legislative role and one for which it
lacks both authority and competence." 6 On the contrary, all the Court had
done in its earlier decisions was to recognize as being fundamental those rights
which were already established constitutional rights, such as the right to inter-
state travel.'
57
The majority position held that the Court did not in its other strict scrutiny
150 Id. at 37-38.
151 Id. at 24. The Court found there was no basis on the record for assuming that the
poorest people are concentrated in the poorest districts. In fact, it observed that the poor may
be found to be clustered around commercial and industrial centers which provide the most
attractive tax bases. Id.
152 Id. at 25.
153 Id. at 28.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 30.
156 Id. at 31.
157 Id. at 32.
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cases invoke an ad hoc determination as to the social or economic importance of
human rights.15 The lesson of its prior cases, stated Justice Powell, plainly re-
vealed that "it is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitu-
tional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws."' 59
Rather, the key to discovering whether a service or interest is "fundamental" lies
in assessing whether it is among the rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution."' 60 Applying this principle to the Texas property tax situation,
the Court held that there is no guarantee of a right to obtain more than a basic
education.' Where the state law does not cause an absolute denial of educa-
tional opportunities to any of its children, the mere fact that education may be
related to the effective exercise of first amendment freedoms and to the intelligent
exercise of the vote does not mean that education is itself a fundamental personal
right.'62 Justice Powell concluded that the Court does not possess "[t]he ability
or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the
most informed electoral choice."' 63 These are goals to be pursued by legislatures,
not by judicial intrusion.
Moreover, Justice Powell indicated the strict scrutiny rule was inappropriate
to the property tax scheme because it differed in one further respect from the
earlier fundamental right line of cases. Texas was not endeavoring to deprive
anyone of a right to an education. Its system was utilized in an effort to extend
public education and to improve its qualities. Since the thrust of the Texas system
is affirmative, it "should be scrutinized under judicial principles sensitive to the
nature of the State's efforts and to the rights reserved to the States under the
Constitution."' 64 Consistent with this theme, the Court also revealed that for
once it was granting more than a rote genuflection to the principles of federalism.
Justice Powell's admonition for judicial restraint against circumscribing or handi-
capping continued research and experimentation by the states in the educational
financing area proves that a true respect for federalism contributed to the Court's
158 Id.
159 Id. at 33.
160 Id. The Court found support for its holding that social importance is not the critical
determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict scrutiny in two of its recent decisions. In
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), the Court had decided against the claim by tenants in
suits by landlords that the statute should be examined under "a more stringent standard than
mere rationality." Id. at 73. While recognizing the importance of "decent, safe, and sanitary
housing," the Court stated it was "unable to perceive any Constitutional guarantee of access
to dwellings of a particular quality" or any recognition of the right of the poor to occupy
housing beyond the term of their lease, without the payment of rent. Id. at 74.
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court had reversed the
application by a federal district court of the stricter standard of review to Maryland's maximum
family grant provision under its Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. Though
the Court explicitly recognized that public welfare assistance "involves the most basic economic
needs of impoverished human beings," id. at 485, it held this central importance of welfare
benefits was not an adequate foundation for requiring the state to support its law by a com-
pelling state interest. See also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
161 411 U.S. at 35.
162 Id. at 36.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 39.
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determination not to apply the strict test.' In Justice Powell's words, "it would
be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our federal
system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to abrogate systems
of financing public education presently in existence in virtually every State."1 6
Here is a strong indication the Court will pay more attention in the future to the
actual degree to which feasible alternatives may exist and the extent to which
precedents comparable to the practice being hoisted by Congress may have been
successfully tested among the states before the Court applies the stricter judicial
test.
Conclusion
A view is beginning to take shape among the Court which sets some rough
but recognizable boundaries on the application of the strict test. Inherent in this
trend is a distinct and serious concern for the survivability of the federal system.
Both developments have an important nexus with the Court's disposition to up-.
hold congressional enforcement legislation under the Civil War amendments and
indicate that the pause in this area which the Court began with Oregon v.
Mitchell is still very much alive. If, as seems likely, 67 the Court continues its
recent inclination to consider questions of federalism closely and to draw a
clearer analysis for its application of the stricter test, reliance on this test by the
national Congress should not have the dire effects upon state power feared by
some. The "compelling state interest" standard is a legitimate and useful tool
which Congress may properly use in advancement of personal rights and liberties.
Used wisely, Congress can, by tying this doctrine to its broad discretion for action
under the Civil War amendments, further enhance the lives of millions of the
nation's citizens, be they members of racial minority groups striving to achieve
a more equal position in society or part of "middle America" seeking relief from
archaic election disabilities. Bound by the strictures of a newly developing ma-
jority on the Court, the twin doctrines of stricter scrutiny and enforcement clause
legislation raise hope and opportunity for disadvantaged Americans without
doing violence to the fundamental division of power between state and national
governments.
165 Id. at 40.
166 Id. at 44.
167 Predictions as to how the Court's present membership would view future congressional
enactments buttressed by the "compelling interest" principle are clouded by the fact that all
Justices except for Mr. Rehnquist have endorsed the stricter standard in one or more settings.
